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Brexit	and	the	tragedy	of	the	Commons:	how	wedge
issues	generate	detrimental	outcomes
The	difficulty	Theresa	May	and	Boris	Johnson	had	in	winning	the	backing	of	MPs	for	their	Brexit	strategies
illustrates	the	impact	that	‘wedge	issues’	can	have	on	party	politics,	write	Tim	Heinkelmann-Wild	and	Lisa
Kriegmair	(Ludwig-Maximilians-University).	As	issues	like	Brexit	cut	across	traditional	party	lines,	they	are	highly
likely	to	create	intra-party	divisions	and	make	compromises	difficult	to	secure.
It	is	a	political	science	truism	that	individual	actors’	rational	behaviours	often	produce	collectively	sub-optimal
results.	The	politics	of	Brexit	within	the	Conservative	party	is	a	case	in	point.	Brexit	and	the	repeated	failures	to
deliver	it	brought	the	Tories	to	a	breaking	point:	it	contributed	to	disastrous	election	results,	led	to	the	fall	of	Theresa
May’s	government,	and	triggered	the	loss	of	a	parliamentary	majority	for	the	succeeding	government	under	Boris
Johnson,	leading	to	an	early	General	Election.	How	did	this	come	about?
Happier	times…	Theresa	May	on	29	March	2017,	leaving	Downing	St	to	give	a	statement	on
the	triggering	of	Article	50.	Photo:	Number	10</a.	via	a	CC-BY-NC-ND	2.0	licence
The	seemingly	irrational	developments	surrounding	Brexit	were	the	result	of	rational	strategies	employed	by
factions	within	the	Conservative	party	in	reaction	to	the	divisive	nature	of	Brexit.	The	key	feature	of	wedge	issues
such	as	Brexit	is	that	they	cut	across	party	lines,	and	thus	hold	the	potential	to	spark	intra-party	divisions.	Non-
wedge	issues	give	rise	to	conflicts	along	party	lines	because	they	map	onto	the	dominant	left-right	cleavage	that
gave	rise	to	western	party	systems.	By	contrast,	issues	such	as	migration,	the	environment	or	European	integration
do	not	map	easily	onto	the	left-right	cleavage.	When	a	political	issue	is	a	wedge	issues	for	a	party,	the	latter	tries	to
avoid	the	topic.	However,	avoiding	wedge	issues	is	not	always	an	option	–	especially	for	governing	parties.	When
other	parties	highlight	a	subject,	or	when	the	pressure	to	solve	a	problem	is	high,	governing	parties	have	to	engage
with	a	wedge	issue.
Enacting	a	policy	that	addresses	a	wedge	issue	is	complicated	by	its	divisive	nature.	When	dealing	with	non-wedge
issues,	the	government	is	in	a	strong	position.	It	can	count	on	the	overwhelming	support	of	its	party	and	win	over
recalcitrant	members	of	parliament	(MPs)	through	concessions.	With	regard	to	wedge	issues,	the	government	is	in
a	much	weaker	position	and	a	conciliatory	approach	is	not	feasible.	The	number	of	MPs	opposing	the	government’s
policy	is	too	sizable	and	any	attempt	to	secure	their	support	is	likely	to	provoke	resistance	by	other	MPs	that
support	the	policy.
The	ensuing	actor	constellation	therefore	resembles	a	game	of	‘chicken’,	pitting	the	government	against	party
rebels	opposed	to	the	government’s	preferred	policy.	In	this	intraparty	game	(see	Figure	1),	it	is	rational	for	both
sides	to	commit	to	their	preferred	policy	to	force	the	other	side	to	back	down.
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Figure	1:	A	game	of	‘chicken’	within	the	governing	party
To	garner	parliamentary	support,	the	government	will	opt	for	an	uncompromising	strategy	that	we	dub	the	‘politics
of	intransigence’.	It	will	refuse	to	compromise	and	try	to	enhance	the	credibility	of	its	commitment	to	the	preferred
policy.	For	instance,	it	might	present	the	policy	as	a	take-it-or-leave-it	offer	that	parliament	may	only	accept	or
refuse.	The	government’s	intransigence	puts	rebel	MPs	who	oppose	the	government’s	preferred	policy	in	an
uncomfortable	position.	They	can	either	accept	a	policy	they	dislike	or	defeat	their	own	government.	To	avoid	this
uncomfortable	choice,	they	are	likely	to	employ	an	intransigent	strategy	as	well.
The	more	rebel	MPs	credibly	commit	to	their	preferred	policy,	the	more	the	government	finds	itself	between	a	rock
and	a	hard	place.	It	can	stick	to	the	proposed	policy	and	risk	government	failure,	or	it	can	make	concessions	and
alienate	constituencies	that	favour	their	original	policy.	To	avoid	this	uncomfortable	choice,	the	government	is	likely
to	double	down	on	its	politics	of	intransigence	to	force	party	rebels	to	change	their	stance.	While	both	factions
would	be	better	off	compromising,	it	is	individually	rational	for	them	to	counter	intransigence	with	more
intransigence	–	even	at	the	risk	of	escalating	intraparty	conflict	and	government	failure.
The	politics	of	Brexit	inside	the	Conservative	party	under	Theresa	May’s	premiership	were	a	clear	example	of
wedge	issue	politics.	The	statements	of	Conservative	MPs	in	which	they	attributed	blame	during	the	debates	on
Brexit	in	the	House	of	Commons	illustrated	that	the	act	of	defining	a	Brexit	policy	drove	a	wedge	through	the	party.
While	blame	games	in	parliament	are	normally	played	between	the	governing	party	and	the	opposition,
Conservative	MPs	also	assigned	blame	within	their	own	party	to	a	significant	extent.	Figure	2	shows	that	before,
during,	and	after	the	negotiation	of	the	EU	Withdrawal	Agreement,	more	than	a	quarter	of	negative	statements	by
Conservative	MPs	targeted	members	of	their	own	party.
Figure	2:	Conservative	MPs’	blame	attributions	per	100	debate	pages
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	(co-authored	with	Berthold	Rittberger	and	Bernhard	Zangl)	at
the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
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The	divisive	nature	of	Brexit	gave	rise	to	a	game	of	‘chicken’	between	Theresa	May’s	government	and	Tory	rebels,
with	both	sides	employing	intransigent	strategies.	First,	the	government’s	objective	was	to	confront	party	rebels
(and	the	Commons	as	a	whole)	with	a	take-it–or-leave-it	offer,	so	that	they	would	only	be	able	to	accept	or	reject
the	negotiated	agreement.	It	therefore	sought	to	keep	parliamentary	involvement	at	a	minimum.	Second,	the
government	framed	its	agreement	as	the	only	policy	alternative	worth	pursuing	and	ran	down	the	clock	to	put
pressure	on	parliament	to	approve	the	deal.	The	government	also	sought	to	keep	on	the	table	the	two	alternative
outcomes	–	a	‘no-deal’	Brexit	and	no	Brexit	at	all	–	that	(at	the	time)	found	the	least	support	among	MPs.	Finally,
the	government	tied	its	hands	to	its	own	Brexit	policy	by	publicly	stating	its	unwavering	resolve	to	stick	to	the
agreement.	It	emphasised	that	there	was	no	viable	alternative	to	its	deal.
In	reaction	to	the	government’s	politics	of	intransigence,	Tory	rebels	employed	a	similar	strategy.	Pledging	rejection
of	the	negotiated	agreement,	they	sought	to	limit	their	freedom	of	action	by	declaring	red	lines.	During	the
parliamentary	adoption	proceedings	of	the	withdrawal	agreement,	Conservative	rebels	even	began	to	claim	that	a
‘no-deal’	Brexit	was	preferable	to	the	government’s	agreement,	thus	committing	themselves	to	an	uncompromising
position.
With	no	side	willing	to	budge,	both	factions	within	the	Conservative	party	responded	to	intransigence	with	more
intransigence.	This	escalatory	dynamic	became	visible	in	the	share	of	blame	attributions	exchanged	within	the
party.	It	increased	from	roughly	one-third	before	and	during	the	negotiations,	to	over	fifty	percent	during	ratification.
The	average	number	of	blame	attributions	increased	by	over	200	percent.
In	sum,	due	to	the	divisive	nature	of	Brexit,	the	choice	of	a	politics	of	intransigence	was	rational	for	the	government
and	Tory	rebels.	Yet,	it	led	to	seemingly	irrational	and	collectively	sub-optimal	results:	a	governing	party	unable	to
agree	on	a	policy	and	a	prime	minister	who	saw	no	other	solution	to	this	impasse	than	to	step	down.	Unfortunately,
the	politics	of	intransigence	are	likely	to	become	a	recurring	challenge	for	western	democracies.	The	rise	of	the	new
cleavage	between	communitarianism	and	cosmopolitanism	implies	a	proliferation	of	divisive	issues.	To	the	extent
that	governments	cannot	avoid	wedge	issues,	intra-party	conflicts	and	thus	the	risk	of	policy	and	even	government
failure	are	increasing.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	(co-authored	with	Berthold	Rittberger	and	Bernhard
Zangl)	at	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at	LSE
EUROPP	and	has	been	slightly	edited	to	bring	it	up	to	date	since	first	publication.
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